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A Dual Matching Model of Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets

Unpublished
Submitted: Oct 20, 2014
Last Updated: Aug 26, 2015
27 Downloads (3 Downloads in the last 3 months)

This is the implementation of the model that is reported in the submission “High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets” to JASSS by Károly Takács and Flaminio Squazzoni. The model allows for the analysis of the consequences of purposeful selection choices of employers and acceptance decisions of applicants in a labor market with asymmetric information. There is a simple and idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference between average quality and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. The model shows that inequality in employment necessarily emerges also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. The model also shows that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality.

 

Model Status

This model is currently unpublished.

Model Version: 2
Version Notes:

This version includes new reporters, such as the turnover-rate in the labor market.

Platform: NetLogo
Programming Language: Logo (variant)
Operating System: Microsoft Windows
Licensed Under: Academic Free License 3.0
Instructions on Running This Model:

Available Model Versions
Version Number Submitted
1 10/20/2014
2 08/26/2015 This version includes new reporters, such as the turnover-rate in the labor market.
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